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OFFICE OF  U.S.  CHIEF  OF  COUNSEL 
 
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS DIVISION 
 
 APO 124-A    U.S. ARMY 
 
STAFF EVIDENCE ANALYSIS 
 
By: Loeb, Leo [appears on same line as previous] 
 
Date:  18 September 1946 
 
Doc.   No.  NOKW-090 
 
Title and/or general nature: Signed carbon copy of a secret order  by the 
20th Army Command to the Evacuation Staff concerning the  evacuation of 
Northern Norway. 6 pages photostat. 
 
Date: 25/11/44. 
 
Source (Location of original, etc.): 
 
German Document Center, MID, Room MB 863 
 
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
 
65635/10 (Doc. No. WB-249) 
 
PERSONS, FIRMS OR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED: 
 
General L. Rendulic as Commander of 20th Army. TO BE FILED UNDER THESE 
REFERENCE HEADINGS: 
 
NOKW - Spoliation NOKW - Atrocities 
 
SUMMARY (Indicate page nos.): 
 
The document gives detailed instructions about the evacuation  of northern 
Norway and  makes  clear that the  evacuation  has to be  accomplished by 
force because the population did not follow voluntarily the orders to 
evacuate. The order states expressly that the  whole territory has to be 
made empty of human beings in order to  prevent the Russians from using the 
working  capacity  and local  knowledge of the population. All shelters, 
communications and  economic installations have to be destroyed go 
completely that the  enemy cannot find any means for living in this 
territory. All important goods have to be sent away. 
 
The order then gives details about the extent of the territory  and means of 
transporting goods and people from the territory. It  further states that 
the order to evacuate could only be known to the  population by a pamphlet 
signed by the Commander in Chief of the 20th  Armyand the Reichs 
Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territory. Thepopulation could only 
take along what they could carry because of  shortage of transport. Herds of 
reindeers are to be  evacuated  through  a certain route. Further details of 
the evacuation are not of interest in this respect. 
 
(Edited by Theo. Felber, OCC,  8 October 1946.) 
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Rubber Stamp 
 
Penciled Note  Secret  Supplement 5 
 
        Army Headquarters, 25 Nov.44 
 
       War Diary 
 
High Command 20 (Mountain Army  O.Qu./Evacuation Staff 
 
No. 31/44 Secret 
 
The Evacuation of Nothern Norway 
 
I. Mission. 
 
The intention to induce the population of Finland and Ostrom to evacuate 
these territories voluntarily,  failed because of the limited willingness 
to support this demand. 
 
Accordingly, the Fuhrerordered the forced evacuation of the territory 
East of the Lyngenfjord,in order to protect the population from 
Bolshevism. The  Fuehrer-order to the Wehrmacht commander, in Chief of  
North Finland contains the following demands: 
 
1. The territory is to be emptied of human beings  so that the enemy 
cannot rely on the working potential  and local knowledge of the 
population. 
 
2. All quarters, traffic and economic installations  are to be destroyed 
so ruthlessly that the enemy is  deprived of every possibility of living 
in this area. 
 
3. What ever can be evacuated in important goods,  is to be salvaged. 
 
The initial time period set for evacuation, Porsanger territory by 9 
November, Alta/Hammrfest territory by 12 November, and East Troms by 15 
November 44  could be prolonged until 20 November 44 as a result of  a 
Change in the situation. 
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Accordingly a salvaging of economic goods in excess of  the first planned 
amounts was possible. 
 
The territory to be evacuated corresponds to 1 and 1/2 times/the 
[inserted above line] size of Denmark. 
 
The distances on the   single National Highway, the National Highway 50  
amount to 1,000 kilometers from Kirkens to Narvik  and from Hammerfest to 
Tromoso, 500 kilometers. Furthermore this highway was occupied by the 
Marching movement of the Army, so that first of all the sea lane came 
into the question with regard to deportation. 
 
For the purposes of the execution an evacuation staff was formed with the 
High Command of the 20th  (Mountain) Army, to which a representative of 
the  Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories was added. 
 
II. Means. 
 
1. The possibility was merely offered as for as the sea lane was 
concerned t utilize the unused transport space on ships of the Reich 
Commissioner for  Naval Transport (German Commercial Flag) and on Ships 
of the Navy (Reich Service Flags and Reich War Flags).  Beyond that, 
Norwegian local ships and numerous cutters were utilized. 
 
2. On land, the population wandered off individually with their own 
trucks (trucks, omnibusses, and  horse drawn vehicles). The Young folk 
also made use of  bicycles frequently for the march to Narvik. 
 
III. Execution: 
 
1. The inadequate records of the Norwegian resident register were the 
basis for the seizure of the population. According to them, the territory 
to be  evacuated, including the nomadic Lapps has before the  war a 
population, of about 62,000. The [Deleted] 
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The (apparently very restriced) number of those persons who fled the 
evacuation can accordingly only be estimated. 
 
2. On account of lack of time the order to the population for evacuation 
could only take place in the form of an appell decreed jointly by the 
Commander &amp; Chief of the 20 (Mountain) Army and by the Reich 
Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories. 
 
3. Assembly points for the deportation by sea were erected in Billerfjord 
and Homningsvaag for the  area Porsangar and East Finland, in Hammerfest  
for the Island territories,  and in Alta-Sopnes-Burfjord  for  the 
territory Alta with Kaugokeino. 
 
(Page  3 of original) 
 
The felder Traffic took place with trucks and omnibusses, from the sea 
with cutters, or from the Islands  and the wastal localities in North 
Baranger, by units  of the Navy. 
 
Deportation from the Porsanger area took place in  the main through two 
mass transports with 1700 and 1,060 persons on the Steamers "Karal A-rp" 
and "A-dolf Binder"  from Billefjord. In Alta, through a mass transport 
of  750 persons on the supply ship "Dithmarschen".  Deportation for the 
rest, with Norwegian local ships and  cutters. 
 
4. Rounding up organizations were set up through  civilian offices for 
quarters and further transport of  the deported population in Tromso, 
Narvik, and Harstad. 
 
Forwarding to Mosjoen and Trondheim took place  with ships of the 
Norwegian "Hurtigrute". Besides them,  the following ships were utilized: 
the steamers "Brabant",  "Dronning", "Sigurd Jarl", "Stella Polaris" as 
well as 
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"North Star",  and "Polar Ice". This forwarding was finished by  25 Nov. 
44, in the main. 
 
5.  Supplies, including quarters and medical help  could not be 
guaranteed by the civilian sector in  this wide area to a full extent. 
The Wehrmacht helped   accordingly on a [inserted above] generous scale: 
 
a) through the provision ofrations where supplies could not be managed in 
such bulk by thecivilian sector. In the reception stations on land as 
well as on boardthe German ships warm rations were given out  from field 
kitchens. 
 
b) through the provision of barrack camps as quarters at the assembly 
points, Billefjord and Sopnes. 
 
c) through the help of the unit during transport to the coast, as well as 
during embarkation, especially  by assisting families with children. 
 
(page 4 of original). 
 
d) through large-scale care of sick, injured, pregnant women, and mothers 
with small children by  doctors and medical installations. Admission of 
women  for confinement into hospitals, further transport on  hospital 
ships, provision of small children with  milk etc.) [sic] 
 
The transport of sick and injured from outlying  Homes for the Aged and 
Homes for tubercular cases whose evacuation was necessary, in order not 
to  afford the enemy propaganda material, required an  especial 
regulation. The deportation fron Karasjok,  Boerselv, Kautokeino, and 
Talvik and/or Korsfjord  tookplace under the responsible leadership of 
Oberarzt Dr.Gaebler withmedical trucks of the Wehrmacht and our own boats 
used for this. 
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6.) The population could only take what baggage  they could carry, on a 
ccount [sic] of the restrictions of the  transport space. The cattle had 
therfore to be taken  over by the Wehrmacht against memoranda receipt,  
as far as it could not, in individual cases, be taken along. 
 
After extension of the evacuation time an extensive  salvaging of 
important economic goods was also ordered   for the civilian sector. Here 
the execution was the   responsibility of [inserted above line] the 
Wehrmacht. Furthermore, a final  search was carried out by the Norwegian 
police detachments  on the islands and outlying localities. Destruction 
will accordingly only be ordered by the subordinate sector commanders 
(Unterabschnittskommandeure)  and/or rear guard officers in agreement 
with the  evacuation commissioners when the salvaging of valuable  
economic goods (especially fishery equipment) is finished, or impossible. 
 
Salvaging of the reindeer herds took place by an  order to the Lapps to 
drive their herds to the  west over Kautokeino-Helligskogen into a 
reception  territory in Tromsfylke. A retreat to the South was  prevented 
by a blockade on the Swedish border, a lock  at Helligskogen made 
possible the driving through of the reindeer herds by the march movements 
of the  unit on to the highway Finland-Skibotn, This action  cannot be 
finished yet, 
 
(page 5 of original) 
 
since on account of the slight snowfall, the expedition of the Lapps, 
could not be put into operation  yet to full extent. Where a herd could 
not be trans- 
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mitted farther, part of the animals were taken over against memoranda 
receipts by the Wehrmacht;the Lapps were nevertheless left the minimum 
necessary  for existence. 
 
IV Results (see appendx [sic]) 
 
1.) In the reception organization, including  the fisherman already 
settled on the Lofetes  36914 persons were taken all together. About, 
5,000  persons migrated before the start of the evacuation  up till 
October from East Finland. About ll00 persons  have migrated  by means of 
self-aid without passing  through the reception organization a smaller 
residue  of workers of the Wehrmacht is to be moved off later  with the 
unit. 
 
2.)  About   10,000persons have remained in the area of Kirkenes, as a 
result of the warevents. In West Finland and East Tromso only about 8,500 
persons,  in the main Lapps, are left behind, whose deportation  was only 
of interest in connection with the finding  back of reindeer herds. 
 
The evacuation in the territory between Lyngenfjord and Porsangerfjord 
could therfore [sic] be carried  through almost completely. Even voices 
of the Swedish  press had to admit the success of the action and speak of 
an almost 100% evacuation of the population. 
 
The success of the action was made possible through the excellent 
corporation of all participating offices  of the Wehrnacht, the Reich 
Commissioner, and the Norwegian administration. 
 
V. Experiences. 
 
1. Orderly evacuation under the conditions  imposed is only possible if 
an orderly method of 
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seizure is present in the hands of an administrative medium. 
 
(page 6 of original) 
 
Both were not at hand. TheNorwegian citizens (Lensmaenne) were partly the 
first to leave theirrealm of their own accord. The administration In  
Hammerfest and in Talvik worked well. 
 
2.) Even in short periods for evacuation, a frictionless, development is 
possible, if a calendar is  also at hand in civilian offices for the 
evacuation  of important goods. Idleness and avoidable losses of  
important goods result from improvising. 
 
3.) It contributes in any case to the quieting of  the population, if 
every family can have at their  disposal a memorandum with the individual 
orders for  carrying out the evacuation. Such a memorandum was  to be 
issued by Minister Lie according to the suggestion of the Army Hq, but 
came too late, to have any  great affect on the population. 
 
4.) Some untoward events, such as the execution  of the "Law concerning 
hand and span services" with the separation of the men from their 
families to be deported and with guarding like prisoners, burning down of  
houses in the presence, of the inhabitants even where an immediate 
destruction was not necessary and shelling of the locality Kjollefjord by 
units of the navy, hinder the readiness of the population to  follow the 
officially proscribed  way . 
 
(sgd.) Herrmann 
 
Col and Leader of the Evacuation Staff Distribution:  In draft 
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Enclosure to High Command of the  20th (Moiuntain) Army 
 
O.Q/Evacuation Staff  No.   31/44 secret 
 
Paragraph IV 
 
Table of Evacuation 
 
A_s per: 25.11.44 
 
No. of residents to be evacuated on 9.4.1940: 
 
  East Finmark  circa   25,000 
 
West Finmark  circa  27,000 
 
Truns, eastwards circa  10,000 
 
Lyiigefjord    62,000 
 
       
 
Carrying out of the evacuation: 
 
1.) People evacuated: 
 
a)   Evacuees included in report 
 
Via Tromso to South 29 ,014 
 
Via Narvik  circa  3,400 
 
Via Harstad  circa  1,000 
 
On ill a Lofoten 
 
               Islands  circa    3,500 36,914 1,101 
 
5,000 
 
285 
 
43,300 
 
b)   Moved to the South without registering 
 
c)  Moved from East Finmark 
until October  circa 
 
d)   Workors enployed by the 
 
Werhmacht  etc.  Transported with  the troops. 
 
2.)  People not evacuated: 
 
No longer able to leave East 
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Finmark   circa  10,000  
Laplanders remaining in West  
Finmark (mainly Nomads)         8,500 
 
  Fugitives who have avoided 
 
evacuation   circa     200  18,700 
 
        62,000 
 
[....] 







